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1

Knowing Habeas Corpus When You
See It
For Suspension Clause purposes, we should define “habeas corpus” as a proceeding in which an
independent court conducts an inquiry and determines whether a jailer is entitled to hold a
prisoner. 1 All students exploring the field should keep their eyes firmly fixed on that landmark
and resist being distracted by legalisms.
Some legalisms, to be discussed in the next chapter, relate to the name given to the
lawsuit challenging the imprisonment (i.e., whether the action is called one for habeas corpus).
The current topic, though, is legalisms that lead to a misunderstanding even of those actions that
do bear the habeas corpus label.
“Perhaps the best known ‘rule’ concerning habeas corpus was that against controverting
the return.” 2 In other words, if the jailer responded to the writ ordering production of the prisoner
with a document stating some reason that would if true constitute a valid basis for the detention,
the court could not inquire into the truth of the reason. This “rule” obscures far more than it
illuminates.
In fact, common law judges “routinely considered extrinsic evidence such as in-court
testimony, third party affidavits, documents, and expert opinions to scrutinize the factual and
legal basis for detention.” 3 Employing a variety of procedural devices, they simply nullified the
“rule.” For instance, after receiving an application for habeas corpus supported by extensive
affidavits, the judges might not issue the writ (thereby triggering a return) but rather issue an
order requiring the jailer to show cause why the writ should not issue (thereby triggering an
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answer to the order to show cause that would be fully litigated). 4 Or, once the jailer had
produced the prisoner in court but before formal filing of the return, the judges might take formal
or informal testimony from anyone (including the prisoner and counsel) with knowledge of the
circumstances. 5
By the time of the early national period the lower federal courts commonly conducted
evidentiary hearings in habeas cases to examine the substantive legality of detentions. 6 This took
place most frequently in the context of challenges to military enlistments, where the return to the
writ would invariably be that the alleged soldier had regularly enlisted, and the court would
conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether, for example, he had been drunk or
underage at the time. 7
To take a typical instance, on December 31, 1827, George Peters submitted a habeas
corpus petition to the United States District Court for West Tennessee setting forth that he was
being held by Captain Robert Sands, who claimed “that your petitioner has been enlisted in the
US Army for five years.” 8 But, “your petitioner most positively avers that if he has enlisted it
was done at a time when he was wholly incapable of transacting business or understanding it by
reason of intoxication.”
The court issued the writ as requested, and, having the parties before it, listened to full
evidentiary presentations by both sides. Whereupon, it concluded, “that at the time the said
Peters enlisted, he was not in a state of mind which would make his contracts binding—but the
undersigned is satisfied at the same time that the conduct of Captain Sands was entirely
honorable and correct as it appeared in evidence that a stranger would be unable to detect the
alienation of the said Peters’ mind altho’ it might exist at the time of conversation.” Accordingly,
the court ordered “that the said Peters be discharged from the Service of the United States, and
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that his enlistment be taken for nothing.” 9
Of course, at the end of any inquiry judges might conclude that a custody was justified. In
that case, the outcome would be an order denying the writ of habeas corpus. But to say, as
writers sometimes do, that the petitioner had been held not to be entitled to habeas corpus is at
best ambiguous and at worst misleading. 10 By obtaining judicial review of the facts and law
underlying the detention, the petitioner had actually obtained “habeas corpus without the writ.” 11
Anyone who reads decided cases without understanding this is likely to misunderstand their
import.
The failure to learn these lessons of history was one of the elements that led the US Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit to perform so poorly when in 2003 it considered a habeas
corpus challenge by Yaser Hamdi, an American citizen, to his detention as an alleged enemy
combatant. In dismissing Hamdi’s petition, the court, likely misreading a number of older
English cases in the way just described, adopted a rule very similar to the long-discredited “rule
against controverting the return.” The Court of Appeals wrote that the government was entitled
to prevail once it presented an affidavit containing factual assertions that “would, if accurate,
provide a legally valid basis for Hamdi’s detention.” 12
Recognizing that the effect of such a rule would be to deprive Hamdi of precisely the
independent judicial examination into the justification for his imprisonment that is the historical
essence of habeas corpus, the Supreme Court reversed. The court wrote, “It would turn our
system of checks and balances on its head to suggest that a citizen could not make his way to
court with a challenge to the factual basis for his detention by his Government, simply because
the Executive opposes making available such a challenge.” 13 Faced with the prospect of having
to justify Hamdi’s detention before a judge, the government instead hastily released him. 14
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Conducting an independent investigation into whether a custodian may continue to
confine someone and issuing a binding order of release if the custodian has not shown a factual
and legal basis for doing so is a core function of an independent judiciary. That, in substance, is
what “habeas corpus” means, 15 as it has for some five hundred years. 16 The most meaningful
way to view the past, present, and future of the writ is within that framework.

4
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Habeas Corpus With and Without the
Writ
Some Illustrative Cases
To show what is lost by confining research into habeas corpus solely to cases bearing that name,
this chapter presents a series of cases successfully challenging illegal detentions. Those in
section A are labeled “habeas corpus” and those in section B are not. But the cases in section A
differ from those in section B only formally, not functionally. The cases in each group not only
display factual isomorphism but, as chapter 3 will describe, display common characteristics in
judicial approach.

A. Formal Habeas Cases
i. An Unappreciated Constable
In 1714, Charles Banfild was an appointed constable for the town of Portsmouth, New
Hampshire. One of his duties was to collect taxes from the townspeople and remit them to the
Selectmen. But things did not go well. 17
As Banfild explained to the New Hampshire Superior Court in mid-August of that year,
he used his best endeavors to collect but the “people would not pay.” And as fast as he hauled the
delinquents before the local Justices of the Peace (“J.P.’s”) for non-payment, just so fast did the
J.P.’s discharge them. This process was interrupted only by his own imprisonment for nonpayment of the taxes to the Selectmen, which he had been unable to end by posting bond so that
he might return to his collection efforts.
5

Banfild complained that his imprisonment was not only most unjust but also manifestly
illegal because:
1. his incarceration was contrary to the provincial statute under which he had been
appointed, 18 inasmuch as he had sufficient assets to pay the taxes in
dispute; and
2. the Selectmen who had first appointed him and then procured his imprisonment
were without authority because they had been invalidly chosen; 19 and
3. it could “in no way be justifiable” for him to be imprisoned for not remitting to
the Selectmen taxes from those townspeople whose obligations had been
discharged by the J.P.’s.
Banfild accordingly sought from the Superior Court “an order . . . agreeable to & in the nature of
an habeas Corpus . . . to bring your petitioner (in Custody) before your honors that so he may
have a proper hearing of his Complaint & may have such remedy as to your honors shall seem
Just & Agreeable to Law.”
When the court considered the matter on August 11, 1714, it ordered Banfild to be
brought before it. 20 Perhaps considering Banfild a security risk, the sheriff initially refused to
obey this order. The irritated court followed up by telling him to bring into court the next day not
only Banfild “in safe custody,” but also the J.P.’s who had committed him to prison and the
Selectmen complained of. This was done and the parties worked out an arrangement for
Banfild’s prompt release. Banfild and a guarantor would enter into a penal bond under which
they agreed to pay twice the amount due unless within five weeks Banfild paid to the Selectmen
the taxes they claimed, less the amounts owed by taxpayers whose obligations the J.P.’s had
forgiven. 21
6

ii. J.P. Chase Feels Insulted; Benjamin Whittemore is Imprisoned
On May 31, 1771, Benjamin Whittemore of Nottingham West, New Hampshire was called
before J.P. Ezekial Chase to acknowledge his signature on a land deed. Instead of complying,
Whittemore violently ripped his signature off the page and fled. 22 On June 2, the irate J.P. issued
an order for Whittemore’s imprisonment, which resulted in his being jailed on June 5. 23 On June
7, Whittemore filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with New Hampshire Superior Court
Chief Justice Atkinson that alleged that he was being “unjustly held and detained without any
lawful cause for such detainer set forth by the said Ezekial Chase, Esq. in his order of
commitment.” The justice signed an order granting the writ on June 8; on June 9, Whittemore
came before him, posted bail, and was released. When the full court convened at the beginning
of September, a paperwork glitch emerged requiring the issuance of another writ of habeas
corpus; this took place within a day. 24 In mid-September, the underlying proceedings against
Whittemore were quashed without objection.

iii. An Alleged Slave
In New Hampshire, as elsewhere, suits by alleged slaves claiming freedom were common, 25 and
there as elsewhere the suits could be brought in many legal forms. One possibility was to petition
for a writ of habeas corpus. 26 That is what Peter Johnson of Portsmouth, New Hampshire did in
the summer of 1748 in claiming that he had been wrongfully “imprisoned for refusing to serve as
a slave.” 27 The Superior Court ordered that the alleged owner appear, and when he did, the issue
of Johnson’s status was put to a jury. 28 On its finding Johnson to be free, the court ordered that
“he be enlarged and the Sheriff set him at Liberty.” 29

iv. An Impoverished Service Member
Members of the armed forces in the early 1800s who were imprisoned in violation of a federal
7

statute exempting active duty military personnel from arrest for debt would routinely seek and
gain release through writs of habeas corpus. 30 Thus, for example, in May 1814, George Daze
presented to US District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania a petition setting forth
that he was “an enlisted seaman in the service of the United States,” currently “in confinement in
the debtors apartment of the City and County of Philadelphia” by virtue of an execution (a copy
of which was attached to the petition) issued on a state court judgment for debt; that “by the
provisions of an Act of Congress approved the 11th of July 1798,” he was “exempted from all
personal arrests for any debt or contract”; and praying for “a Habeas Corpus directed to the
keeper of the debtors apartment that he may be discharged according to Law.”
The court responded by requiring the keeper of the debtors’ apartment to produce Daze
“forthwith.” The keeper’s written return confirmed that Daze had correctly set forth the cause of
his detention, and the court signed an order the same day, May 27, 1814, releasing him:
“Discharged. The Act of Congress forbids arrests of persons lawfully engaged in naval Service.”

B. Functional Habeas Cases
i. Certiorari: J.P. March Feels Insulted; Peter Pearse Is Imprisoned
One winter’s day in 1769, 17 months before Benjamin Whittemore ripped the deed from the
hands of J.P. Chase, Peter Pearse had an encounter on a Portsmouth, New Hampshire street with
Clement March, a J.P. whom he had just seen inside the courthouse. Pearse asked March “what
reason he had to call him a chattering fellow in the Court,” and “added that the said March was a
Blockhead as much as any in a Barber’s Shop and called him a Rogue afterwards.” 31 March
responded by having Pearse presented for contempt to his own inferior court, which denied
requests for counsel and jury trial, summarily convicted Pearse of contempt, and ordered him
8

imprisoned until such time as he could provide sureties for good behavior. His incarceration
lasted approximately 8 hours. 32 Within that time he filed with Chief Justice Theodore Atkinson
of the Superior Court a petition for a writ of certiorari; it was granted and Pearse was released on
bail the same day, December 23, 1769. The contempt proceedings were eventually quashed
without objection.

ii. Personal Replevin: Another Alleged Slave
Late in 1750, an alleged slave named Phebe Nung of Dover, New Hampshire, gained her
freedom through a different legal procedure than the one Peter Johnson had invoked two years
earlier. 33 She brought an action of personal replevin against her alleged owners, Vincent and
Lois Tarr, to test who had the superior right to possession of herself, the subject of the action. 34
The sheriff promptly seized her pendente lite—that is, he took an appearance bond from Nung—
and the case was tried to a jury. 35 It found in her favor and the same result was reached on
appeal, resulting in a ruling that she was “a free woman and that she enjoy her freedom.” 36

iii. Bare Demands
a. Another Impoverished Service Member
On February 25, 1745, Captain Jonathan Tuften Mason of the British Army presented a petition
to the New Hampshire Superior Court alleging that a soldier under his command, one Andrew
Downer, was being detained in prison for a debt of less than 10 pounds, in violation of an Act of
Parliament, 37 and requesting no more than that “Your Worships would put the Act of Parliament
in force by releasing and setting the said Andrew Downer at liberty, that his Majesty’s Service
may not suffer thereby.” 38 The court responded the next day with an order that a writ of
supersedeas “forthwith be issued” to the presiding judge in the debt action, “prohibitting any
further prosecution of said Downer,” 39 and directing Downer’s release.
9

b. An Abused Apprentice
In the fall of 1749, the widow Elizabeth Bird of Portsmouth, New Hampshire complained to the
Superior Court that her son John Bird, age 14, was apprenticed to a ropemaker named Richard
Winter, but that the latter (who was in prison) had for a long period neglected John—failing “to
provide suitable and sufficient meat drink lodging and clothing” and not permitting him to attend
public worship. She prayed simply for “the advisement of this Court on the Premises and that
your complainant may have some relief in the Premises.” 40
The court responded by issuing a writ of habeas corpus to have Winter brought before it,
which was done the same day. 41 Having reviewed the indenture he produced, and there being
“nothing made to appear that the said servant had ever been provided for as in said indenture
mentioned and the particular facts complained of appearing to be true”—not to mention that
Winter had not even taught John to read—the court concluded that Winter was not entitled to
retain John’s custody, which was returned to his mother.

c. A Headless Baby
One particularly dramatic example of a petitioner obtaining release after filing a non-specific
demand was the “Case of the Headless Baby” in Massachusetts in 1662–63. 42 A free black
woman by the name of Zipporah was suspected of killing her illegitimate child, but because the
father was probably the scapegrace nephew of a powerful local aristocrat (rather than another
black servant who was being officially blamed), the authorities were in no position to prosecute,
and she languished in jail for months. Eventually, she wrote to the court, noting that she (unlike
her putative paramour) was being held without bond notwithstanding they were both equally
guilty of fornication and “humbly beseech[ing] this honored Court, to call her before you, and to
deal with her, as to yor wisedomes and mercy shall see meet, that she may not lye where she is to
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perrish[.]”
This document may or may not have been a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
technically, 43 but it certainly was one functionally. Responding to her demand to be charged or
released, an indictment charging Zipporah with infanticide was presented for consideration to a
grand jury; when it refused to indict her, she was freed.
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The Benefits of a Functional View:
The Past Educating the Present
As chapter 1 showed, the critical privilege protected by the Suspension Clause of the
Constitution is a speedy and meaningful judicial examination of the justification for an
imprisonment.
Indeed, the Suspension Clause jurisprudence of the Supreme Court has been
commendably pragmatic in asking whether the system at hand provides an adequate and
effective mechanism for independent judicial review of a detention. 44 In answering that question,
the court relies heavily on the raw material unearthed by legal historians and presented in legal
briefs. Section A of this chapter suggests that those briefs would be enriched, to the enhancement
of the court’s rulings, if they were written from a functional perspective.
The task of giving content to the Supreme Court’s pronouncements rests on the lower
courts, which can approach it in various ways. Section B of this chapter describes the pragmatic
approach their common law predecessors took.
Section C applies the lessons of this history to a modern litigation arising from the
imprisonment of alleged terrorists at Guantanamo Bay.

A. Educating the Supreme Court
If Supreme Court briefs in Suspension Clause cases were written from a functional perspective,
they could cite many more cases than they commonly do because they would not limit
themselves to cases bearing the “habeas corpus” denomination.
12

The justification for this approach is simple. The question of why common law litigants
seeking release from imprisonment invoked one writ rather than another is (a) simply antiquarian
because the writ system vanished generations ago; (b) essentially unanswerable because of the
informality of colonial legal recordkeeping and legal practice; 45 and (c) at the end of the day, the
wrong question to be asking for present purposes. As the examples in chapter 2 illustrated, when
suitors communicated to judges claims of wrongful imprisonment and demanded a judicial
inquiry, judges consistently responded in a way that cut through any technical obstructions. This
was most certainly a situation in which “no one cared whether wrong writs were used.” 46
To be sure, as many judges, practitioners, and scholars have elucidated with great
effort, 47 there were indeed differences, ones that varied with time and place, 48 among and
between the prerogative writs such as habeas corpus, 49 prohibition, 50 and certiorari. 51 Thus, to
revisit some examples from chapter 2, it may well be that because Whittemore had been
summarily committed by a magistrate and Pearse convicted of contempt by an inferior court,
habeas corpus to bring up the body was thought procedurally appropriate in the first instance and
certiorari to bring up the record in the second. 52 Similarly, Nung’s use of the writ of personal
replevin might reflect a view of that writ as being better suited than the writ of habeas corpus to
deal with a situation in which neither party was in prison and private actors were imposing the
restraint. 53
But when placing legal cases into categories, the critical question is for what purpose the
categorization is being undertaken. 54 The distinctions among common law writs are of marginal
relevance at best to an inquirer whose purpose is obtaining greater insight into the Suspension
Clause. A person with that goal should arrange the cases by what the courts did rather than what
they said, and should define “habeas corpus” as simply a collective name for what judges did
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when they “had been convinced by a story that they should examine more closely the
circumstances of a person’s imprisonment.” 55

B. Educating the Lower Courts
Once moved to review an imprisonment, the common law courts considered it their duty to see
that justice was done, 56 and implemented their view through a predictable series of responses
that reflected the environment in which they were working. The environment has since changed,
but the judges on today’s lower courts would have much to learn from those courts’ approach to
their task.

i. The Jurisprudential Environment of Common Law Courts
Irrespective of whether they were dealing with habeas corpus, the professional world in which
courts operated prior to the middle decades of the nineteenth century was sharply unlike ours. 57
The pervasive tendency of judges trying to reach just outcomes was to focus on facts, not law. In
particular, two features of the environment discouraged the disposition of cases on legal grounds.
The first was practical: legal authority was hard to come by. Printed law reports were rare
at best, 58 and during the early national period legislatures sometimes specifically forbade the
publication and citation of judicial opinions. 59 Moreover, court systems frequently did not
include superior appellate courts with law-pronouncing powers. 60 Indeed, during the colonial
period and beyond, New Hampshire and Massachusetts appeals were normally decided by a
second or sometimes a third jury, and a similar practice was followed in post-Independence
Pennsylvania. 61 Thus, the common law was for purely practical reasons inherently fact-centric to
a degree that we—particularly those of us educated professionally from casebooks consisting
largely of appellate court decisions chosen to teach legal doctrines—can only with difficulty
14

appreciate. 62
Second, law determination was difficult intellectually as well as practically. All
professional actors understood that the substantive contents of the common law had an objective
existence. 63 When they did engage in legal reasoning the judges saw their task as finding that
law in cooperation with counsel, 64 not making it. 65 This often involved the serious expenditure of
effort. 66 One reason was that statutes, even if accessible, were by no means determinative of the
law. They might be part of it, but they did not define or exhaust it. Rather, judges would give
them appropriate consideration as evidence of what the law was. 67 As the estimable scholarship
of Professor Paul Halliday has confirmed, the marginal role of statutory law applied fully in the
field of habeas corpus. Legislative intervention was rare and almost always unnecessary or
counterproductive. 68 In any event, finding the correct legal answer required independent judicial
consideration of a good deal of data, which included, but was by no means limited to, the
pronouncements of legislators, previous judges, scholars, and others. 69

ii. The Common Law Courts’ Responses to Prisoners
a. Speed Matters: Facts Beat Law and Settlements Beat Adjudications
In cases involving potentially unlawful imprisonments the judicial orientation toward focusing
on facts rather than law was particularly strong. 70 Because, for the logistical and intellectual
reasons just described, the facts were commonly easier to find than the law, taking this approach
was likely to yield a faster result. 71
Consider how the court responded to the habeas corpus petition of Charles Banfild, the
hapless tax collector described in chapter 2 (A) (i). As informative as what it did do—speedily
calling all interested parties into the courtroom and coming to a pragmatic resolution to secure
15

Banfild’s prompt liberation 72—is what it did not do. It made no ruling on any of the three
perfectly reasonable legal arguments he had presented. Its impulse was to deal with facts, not
law. This was the typical approach of a common law court, as the cases in the next few
paragraphs illustrate.
On Saturday January 24, 1761, Mrs. Deborah D’Vebre, who had been confined to a
private madhouse by her husband, sought habeas corpus in London. 73 The court responded with
an order that a medical expert, her nearest relation, and her attorney “be admitted and have free
access” to her at all reasonable times “in order to consult with, advise and assist the said Deborah
D’Vebre.” On Monday, January 26, the court convened to take the affidavit and live testimony of
the medical expert, who reported that he had seen no indications of mental disorder. After
hearing this, Lord Mansfield said, “Take a writ of habeas corpus: and if this should appear to be
the case, we ought to go further.” So the keeper of the madhouse brought in Mrs. D’Vebre
herself, but “no return was indorsed upon the writ.” 74 In interchange with the bench she
“appeared to be absolutely free from the least appearance of insanity,” and—since she did not
wish to return to the madhouse but the court thought that she could not safely be trusted to the
custody of her husband—she was released overnight in custody of her attorney. “It afterwards
ended in a compromise, and an agreement to separate.”
Because fact-finding was faster than law-finding, habeas courts in England dealing with
impressment cases often “made findings of fact to avoid reaching particularly difficult questions
of law,” as Professor Jonathan L. Hafetz has documented. 75
A settlement might be even faster. Thus, when in 1779 habeas was sought on behalf of
two boys impressed into military service who sought release on the grounds that they were
apprentices, Lord Mansfield could likely have issued the writ as a legal matter, 76 but his actual
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response was that “a shorter way to work” would be for him to issue a warrant to have the boys
brought into court to sort the matter out between the claimants to their services. 77 Indeed, many
habeas challenges to military impressments never got to court at all because the authorities began
internal investigations on receipt of the writ and discharged petitioners who appeared to have
been illegally conscripted. 78
And the most famous English slave case of the eighteenth century, Somerset v. Stewart, 79
only reached its celebrated judgment in favor of liberty because the parties insisted on rejecting
Lord Mansfield’s repeated efforts to broker a settlement. 80

b. In Dealing with Law, Merits and Focus Matter
Notwithstanding the strong judicial preference to take a fact-specific approach, legal issues
might obtrude in two different ways.
First, a procedural technicality might pose a potential delay to reaching the merits. In that
case the courts would knock aside the barrier, as happened in the case of the deed-ripper
Whittemore whom we saw in chapter 2 (A) (ii). 81 As Professor Stephen I. Vladeck puts it, the
writ would “transcend jurisdictions, championing substance (whether the jailer had a legal basis
for confining the prisoner) over jurisdictionally-varied procedural forms.” 82 This might happen
in a variety of ways, including that a nominal rule ceased being enforced in practice or that an
actual rule was bent more or less sharply in a particular instance. 83 Indeed, I have not seen any
case before 1867 in which an incarcerated petitioner was denied relief on the basis of having
made a procedural misstep.
Second, in some instances a ruling on the merits might ineluctably require determination
of a legal question. In that case the judges worked actively to see that the core legal issue was
stated as narrowly as possible and resolved quickly. 84 For example, as Professor James Oldham
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reports, when Lord Mansfield had before him a habeas corpus case in which the dispositive
question would be whether the conceded fact of petitioner’s employment as a liveryman on the
Thames exempted him from impressment, the judge assisted counsel in formulating accordingly
the issue to be litigated. 85 He proceeded the same way in Somerset. 86
Similarly, in an English case of 1629 reported by Professor Paul Halliday, Margaret
Symonds disrupted a church service by laughing at the preacher in alleged violation of a statute
and was imprisoned (although promptly granted bail pendente lite). 87 “All agreed that Margaret
had laughed in church. But her case remained surrounded by factual, and thus legal, doubts.
What made Margaret laugh? Was the sermon so bad that she could not help herself? Or was
laughter a sign of her contempt for what she considered dubious doctrine? The return to the writ
did not say.” As the justices of King’s Bench approached the case, “There was no mention of
precedents, no analogizing to ostensibly similar cases.” Instead, the justices construed the statute
to apply only to situations in which the disruption was intended to express opposition to the
doctrine being taught. Since the return to the writ was silent on that critical legal issue, it failed to
show sufficient cause for the detention and “they sent Margaret home.”

C. Applying the Lessons in National Security Cases
A skeptical reader might point out that the wrongful imprisonment cases of serious concern
today do not arise in the context of disrespectful congregants or insolvent tax collectors. Modern
courts are likely to find themselves confronted with claims by the government that the
incarceration of a particular individual is vital to public safety in connection with the worldwide
struggle against terrorism. Don’t we face novel national security problems, so that responses
derived from the common law are simply impractical? My answer is no. The approach just
described was practical and desirable in national security cases then and is now.

18

i. Then
There is nothing new about national security crises. The Glorious Revolution—a celebrated
landmark in constraining royal power by law—was born in the midst of one. 88 In December
1688, the Catholic James II of England, having lost all political support, fled the Kingdom to be
succeeded by William and Mary. But James (who had also been King of Ireland and Scotland,
where he retained many supporters) mounted a re-invasion, landing in Ireland in March 1689.
His Scottish allies staged a military uprising that achieved early success and continued to pose a
threat for many months. The prospect that forces supporting him would launch an invasion of
England from France appeared increasingly plausible. Although James was defeated at the battle
of Boyne in Ireland in July 1690 and fled for what proved to be the last time, open warfare
persisted into the fall of 1691.
Meanwhile, “there were plenty of Jacobites in England who could not foreswear their
allegiance to the man they considered their divinely anointed king. Rebellion seemed imminent,
especially when so many were arrested for printing seditious libels, for conspiring against the
king and queen or for being priests—or worse, Jesuits.” 89 When the judges of King’s Bench
(appointed largely by William and hence unlikely to have any sympathy for his rival) examined
the cases of 147 such arrestees on writs of habeas corpus in 1689–90, they found that 20 percent
of the prisoners posed a danger known to the law and should therefore be remanded for trial on
criminal charges. But in the remaining 80 percent of the cases, a closer look at the seemingly
suspicious circumstances—such as an ill-timed trip to France or Ireland—showed that “many
men and women had been jailed on the thinnest evidence or caught in indiscriminate trawls for
suspects.” Having reviewed “the alleged facts behind each imprisonment against the relevant
law,” the court ordered the release of those prisoners for whose detentions the government could
not provide solid justification. 90
19

ii. Now
In June 2004, the Supreme Court ruled that prisoners at the US naval base at Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba were entitled to bring writs of habeas corpus to contest their captivity. 91 Nonetheless,
Judge Richard J. Leon of the US District Court for the District of Columbia ruled in January
2005 that as a matter of law they were not. 92 After lengthy delays caused by two intervening
Acts of Congress, the US Supreme Court in 2008 reiterated that they were. 93 Late that year Judge
Leon actually sat down to scrutinize the factual underpinnings of the cases against Lakhdar
Boumediene and the five other men accused with him. 94 As to five of the men, he found wholly
unsupported the government’s allegation that they planned to travel to Afghanistan to engage in
hostilities against US forces and ordered their release, 95 which indeed took place. 96 As to the
final petitioner in this group, the District of Columbia Circuit reversed Judge Leon’s ruling that
he had been properly detained and ordered another look at the case in light of growing doubts
about the government’s factual and legal basis for it. 97
When Judge Leon did in 2008 what he might have done in 2004, and focused on the facts
rather than the law in the interests of restoring to freedom people who had been wrongly
deprived of it, he was exemplifying the common law traditions of habeas corpus, 98 and serving
enduring national interests. 99

1 Independent judicial inquiry into the validity of the imprisonment has for centuries been the
core of habeas corpus. See Paul D. Halliday and G. Edward White, “The Suspension Clause:
English Text, Imperial Contexts, and American Implications,” 94 Virginia Law Review 575,
600 (2008) (describing this as the “single most important feature of habeas corpus
jurisprudence, as it emerged in the seventeenth century”); 6 John H. Baker, The Oxford
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History of the Laws of England, 1443–1558, at 91–94 (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2003) (outlining fifteenth- and sixteenth-century habeas precedents establishing authority of
judges to examine causes of imprisonment and commenting that “the courts had found an
effective means of curbing arbitrary power . . . which deprived a subject of his liberty”). See
also Stephen I. Vladeck, “The New Habeas Revisionism,” 124 Harvard Law Review 941,
988–90 (2011) (suggesting Founders’ key concern was not substantive standards governing
detentions but their application by “an impartial magistrate”). Thus, Boumediene found a
Suspension Clause violation in the inability of the prisoners to have their imprisonments
judicially examined, while explicitly declining to address “the content of the law that governs
petitioners’ detention.” Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 798.
2 Halliday, Habeas Corpus, at 108.
3 Brief for Legal Historians as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners 29, Boumediene, 2007
Westlaw 2441583, at 29. (I was one of the amici who submitted this brief.) See Jonathan
Hafetz, Habeas Corpus After 9/11: Confronting America’s New Global Detention System 83,
279 nn. 25–27 (New York: New York University Press, 2011) (citing cases).
4 See Kevin Costello, “Habeas Corpus and Military and Naval Impressment, 1756–1816,” 29
Journal of Legal History 215, 216–18 (2008) (describing many such cases). See also Brief
for Legal Historians, at 22–26 (describing cases using other devices for same purpose); Marc
D. Falkoff, “Back to Basics: Habeas Corpus Procedures and Long-term Executive
Detention,” 86 Denver University Law Review 961, 967–85 (2009) (providing extended
historical survey).
5 See Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., “Habeas Corpus Proceedings in the High Court of Parliament in the
Reign of James I, 1603–1625,” 54 American Journal of Legal History, 200, 238–39, 249
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(2014) (describing habeas cases in both Houses of Parliament considering documents,
members’ statements, or witness testimony after return to writ had been read). One example
is the case of Deborah D’Vebre described in the text accompanying notes 30–31 to chapter 3.
6 The material in this and the next two paragraphs of text is taken from Freedman, Habeas
Corpus, at 27–28.
7 See, e.g., Beglee v. Anderson, M–1214, roll 1 (C.C. D. Tenn., Aug. 5, 1812); Smith v.
Armstead, M-931, roll 1 (C.C. D. Md., June 16, 1814); United States v. Towson, ibid. (C.C.
D. Md., May 27, 1812). In both the two latter cases there is additional documentation beyond
that on the microfilm in the records of the National Archives and Records Administration
housed in Philadelphia. See also United States ex rel. Wheeler v. Williamson, 28 F. Cas. 682,
685 (E.D. Pa. 1855) (No. 16,725) (finding after hearing that return to writ, which denied
custody over claimed slaves, was “evasive, if not false”); Ex Parte Bennett, 3 F. Cas. 204
(C.C. D. D.C. 1825) (No. 1,311) (examining anew at habeas corpus hearing witnesses who
had appeared before committing magistrate); United States v. Irvine, M-1184, roll 1 (C.C. D.
Ga., May 8, 1815) (discharging petitioner because, despite having been given opportunity,
detaining officer had failed to provide proof to support statement in his affidavit that the
enlistment had obtained the parental consent required by Act of March 16, 1802, ch. 9, § 11,
1 Stat. 135).
8 Matter of Peters, M-1215 (D. W. Tenn., Dec. 31, 1827). All the quotations through the end of
the next paragraph of text are taken from the same source.
9 Additional examples of habeas corpus petitions brought by individuals in the custody of the
military are discussed in chapters 4 and 5.
10 See Dimension 1, at 595–96 (discussing Philip Hamburger, “Beyond Protection,” 109
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Columbia Law Review 1823, 1888–90, 1985 (2009)).
11 Halliday, Habeas Corpus, at 113.
12 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 472 (4th Cir. 2003). The opinion was also deeply flawed in
other respects. See Eric M. Freedman, “Hamdi and the Case of the Five Knights,” Legal
Times, February 3, 2003. These included its failure to learn from a good deal of history
supporting close judicial review in the specific context of challenges to national security
detentions. See text accompanying notes 46–47 to chapter 3; text accompanying notes 36–38
to chapter 13.
13 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536–37 (2004). I was a member of the prisoner’s legal
team in this case.
14 See Joseph Margulies, Guantanamo and the Abuse of Presidential Power (New York: Simon
& Schuster, 2006), 156.
15 See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 787 (holding that for Suspension Clause purposes a “habeas
corpus” proceeding is one in which a “judicial officer [has] adequate authority to make a
determination in light of the relevant law and facts and to formulate and issue appropriate
orders for relief, including, if necessary, an order directing the prisoner’s release”). See text
accompanying notes 19–21 to chapter 15; text accompanying notes 8–9 to the Concluding
Thoughts.
16 See Halliday, Habeas Corpus, at 7.

Chapter 2. Habeas Corpus With and Without the
Writ
17 The account given in this and the following two paragraphs of text is drawn from Provincial
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Case File No. 17944, New Hampshire State Archives. That file contains three petitions: one
dated August 10, 1714, one undated which I believe to be from August 11, 1714, and one
dated August 12, 1714.
18 An Act to Compell Constables to Doe Their Duties in Collecting Rates, passed March 9,
1692–93, in 1 Laws of New Hampshire: Province Period 1679–1702, at 555 (Manchester,
NH: John B. Clarke Co., 1904).
19 The underlying dispute between rival slates of officeholders was resolved over the summer by
the provincial House of Representatives. See Journal of the House of Representatives, July
24, 1714, in 19 Provincial Papers of New Hampshire 55 (Manchester, NH: John B. Clarke,
Public Printer, 1891).
20 The details in this paragraph are to be found in Superior Court Docket Book, 1699–1738, at
86–87, New Hampshire State Archives.
21 Our knowledge of this arrangement comes from Provincial Case File No. 20399, New
Hampshire State Archives, which records the initiation in April 1715 of a lawsuit on the bond
after Banfild allegedly failed to satisfy his obligations under the settlement.
22 This behavior is easily explained; Whittemore had also given a deed to the same land to
another party, resulting in an extended dispute over title, as recorded in Provincial Case File
No. 29935, New Hampshire State Archives. It was that part of the tale, rather than
Whittemore’s brief contretemps with Chase, which involved the greater number of players
and expenditure of judicial resources. For an account, see Dimension 1, at 599 n.38. There
was also a subsequent indictment of Whittemore for assaulting Chase and carrying away the
deed, to which he pleaded not guilty. See Hillsborough County Case File, No. 8133, New
Hampshire State Archives. I have been unable to find any further records of this proceeding.
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23 Chase’s mittimus and the jailer’s endorsed receipt are in Provincial Case File No. 30379, New
Hampshire State Archives. The same file is the source for the statements in the remainder of
this paragraph.
24 For a fuller account, see Dimension 1, at 599 n. 42.
25 See Robert B. Dishman, “Breaking the Bonds: The Role of New Hampshire’s Courts in
Freeing Those Wrongfully Enslaved, 1640s–1740s,” 59 Historical New Hampshire 79, 81
(2005).
26 For English examples, see 2 James Oldham, The Mansfield Manuscripts and the Growth of
English Law in the Eighteenth Century (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
1992), 1225–35 and Halliday, Habeas Corpus, at 174–75, 211–12. For post-Independence
examples, see Paul Finkelman, Slavery in the Courtroom: An Annotated Bibliography of
American Cases (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 1985), 25, 121, 258, and Paul D.
Halliday and G. Edward White, “The Suspension Clause: English Text, Imperial Contexts,
and American Implications,” 94 Virginia Law Review 575, 588–93 (2008). Another example
is Respublica v. Negroes Sam and John (1788) in the file Habeas Corpus 1788–1790,
Pennsylvania State Archives.
27 The proceedings can be found in Provincial Case File No. 22344, New Hampshire State
Archives. Johnson was in prison at the time because his alleged master, George Massey, had
complained to a local Justice of the Peace that he “refuseth to labour and is stubborn and
rebellious” and had requested “that the said Peter may be detained in Prison until he shall
become submissive and dutiful,” whereupon the J.P. had issued an order directing the sheriff
to confine Johnson “until he the said Peter shall behave himself.”
28 This fact shows that what began as a habeas action had, legally speaking, morphed into
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something else, perhaps an action for false imprisonment or one for personal replevin. There
is a fuller discussion in Dimension 1, at 600 n.47.
29 Judgment Book of Superior Court, Vol. A, at 341–42 (Aug. 1744–[June 1750]), New
Hampshire State Archives. The order thus released Johnson both from the physical custody
of the sheriff and from the legal custody of the alleged owner. As further discussed in note 6
to chapter 3, habeas corpus has long been used as a mechanism for challenges not just to
wrongful physical detentions by public or private parties, see Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
475, 484 (1973), but also to legal restraints on liberty, whether imposed by public actors
(e.g., parole boards) or private ones (e.g., alleged masters of apprentices). See Hensley v.
Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 350–51 (1973).
30 The account that follows is taken from Freedman, Habeas Corpus, at 42–43. The federal
statute in question is Act of July 11, 1798, ch. 72, § 5, 1 Stat. 595 (exempting enlisted
servicemen from personal arrest for debt or contract). For a similar New Hampshire case, see
In re Mills, Strafford County Ct., Dec. 18, 1819, Strafford County Court Records, Folder 11,
New Hampshire State Archives (petitioner discharged on habeas corpus after successfully
invoking federal statute in state court).
31 My account is based on Provincial Case File No. 25352, New Hampshire State Archives, and
Judgment Book of Superior Court, Vol. F, 1767–70, at 459–62, New Hampshire State
Archives.
32 This detail comes from Provincial Case File No. 16916, New Hampshire State Archives,
which contains documentation on Pearse’s subsequent civil damages action against March.
That lawsuit is described in the text accompanying notes 18–20 to chapter 6.
A similar set of events took place in the case of William Licht. After being summarily
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incarcerated by a J.P. (and then released on bail) in 1770 on the complaint of two
townspeople of Chester, New Hampshire for harboring a potentially indigent stranger, he
brought successful certiorari proceedings. See Provincial Case File No. 26274, New
Hampshire State Archives; Judgment Book of Superior Court, Vol. G, Feb. 1771–Sept. 1773,
at 83. As described in the text accompanying notes 21–23 to chapter 6, the following year
Licht successfully sued both the J.P. and the complainants for damages.
33 The proceedings in her action are recorded in Provincial Case File No. 22138, New
Hampshire State Archives. There is an account of the case in Dishman, “Breaking the
Bonds,” at 84–86, in which the plaintiff’s name is rendered as “Nong” and the defendants’ as
“Torr.”
34 Such an action was based on the writ de homine replegiando, commonly known as the writ of
personal replevin. See 9 William Holdsworth, A History of English Law (London: Methuen
& Co., 3d ed., 1944), 105 (describing writ as “in substance, the process of replevin, applied
to the purpose of rescuing a person from imprisonment. Just as chattels unlawfully distrained
could be recovered by their owner by the action of replevin, so a person unlawfully detained
could recover his liberty by this writ”). The general scholarly belief is that proceedings under
this writ were antiquated and cumbersome in England by the mid-eighteenth century, and had
largely been superseded by habeas corpus until personal replevin was resurrected by the
northern states to deal with slavery issues. See Dimension 1, at 603 n. 57 (citing scholars).
Nung’s case suggests that further study of the colonial situation would be warranted.
35 The availability of a jury trial was one of the key advantages of proceeding by personal
replevin instead of habeas corpus. See Thomas D. Morris, Free Men All: The Personal
Liberty Laws of the North 1780–1861 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001),
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11–12. See also “Trial by Jury, in Questions of Personal Freedom,” 17 American Jurist and
Law Magazine 94 (1837) (criticizing Massachusetts statute providing that alleged slaves
should bring habeas corpus and abolishing personal replevin but failing to provide for jury
trial); An Act to Restore the Trial by Jury, on Questions of Personal Freedom, Mass. Rev.
Stat., Ch. 221, § 17 (1837) (repealing statute abolishing personal replevin).
36 Judgment Book of Superior Court, Vol. B, Sept. 1750–Mar. 1754, at 87–88, New Hampshire
State Archives. In addition to common law actions such as those described in the text, a
number of states had statutes specifically providing for suits by alleged slaves claiming their
freedom. These statutes varied with respect to such matters as the availability of jury trials
and the extent to which they replaced rather than supplemented the habeas corpus remedy.
See Kely M. Kennington, In the Shadow of Dred Scott: St. Louis Freedom Suits and the
Legal Culture of Slavery in Antebellum America (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2017),
36–38; Lea Vandervelde, Redemption Songs: Suing for Freedom Before Dred Scott (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2014), 8, 18–21, 49.
37 Almost surely this was an invocation of the Mutiny Act, 1716, 3 Geo. I, c. 2 (Gr. Brit.), which
provided that if an arrest were made contrary to the Act, the soldier or his superior officer
could file a complaint demanding an inquiry into the matter and a judicial warrant
discharging him. The Act was, of course, a direct ancestor of the federal statute that freed
George Daze from the debtors’ jail in Philadelphia as described earlier in this chapter.
38 The document is in Provincial Case File No. 21242, New Hampshire State Archives.
39 Superior Court Minutes, 1699–1750, Superior Court Docket Box 1, Folder 1744–45, New
Hampshire State Archives. This concensed phraseology was no doubt intended to (1) stay the
action below (supersedeas) and thereby liberate Downer, and (2) terminate that action
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permanently (prohibition).
40 This account is drawn from Provincial Case File No. 23254 and Judgment Book of Superior
Court, Vol. A, at 463– 64, New Hampshire State Archives.
41 This writ directed the sheriff to bring Winter from prison to court so that he might answer the
charges and be dealt with “as to law and justice appertain.” In other words, the purpose of the
habeas writ in this context was not to bring Winter into court so that he could test his
imprisonment but rather to secure his physical presence so that he could respond to Bird’s
challenge to his custody over John. See note 6 to chapter 3.
42 There is a complete description of the case, reproducing the relevant documents, in Melinde
Lutz Sanborn, “The Case of the Headless Baby: Did Interracial Sex in the Massachusetts Bay
Colony Lead to Infanticide and the Earliest Habeas Corpus Petition in America?,” 38 Hofstra
Law Review 255 (2009). I have relied on this source for my documentation. A more recent
account of the case appears in M. Michelle Jarrett Morris, Under Household Government:
Sex and Family in Puritan Massachusetts (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013),
191–208.
43 See William E. Nelson, “Categorizing Zipporah’s Petition,” 38 Hofstra Law Review 279, 282
(2009).

Chapter 3. The Benefits of a Functional View: The
Past Educating the Present
44 See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 779–93 (2008).
45 See 1 William E. Nelson, The Common Law in Colonial America: The Chesapeake and New
England, 1607–1660 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 37, 71, 92; 2 William E.
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Nelson, The Common Law in Colonial America: The Middle Colonies and the Carolinas,
1660–1730 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 26, 28, 41–42, 87–89, 128–30, 138; 3
William E. Nelson, The Common Law in Colonial America: The Chesapeake and New
England, 1660–1750 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 120–21; A. G. Roeber,
Faithful Magistrates and Republican Lawyers: Creators of Virginia Legal Culture, 1680–
1810 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981), 57–60; William E. Nelson,
“Legal Turmoil in a Factious Colony: New York, 1664–1776,” 38 Hofstra Law Review 69,
150–51 (2009); William E. Nelson, “Politicizing the Courts and Undermining the Law: A
Legal History of Colonial North Carolina, 166–1775,” 88 North Carolina Law Review 2133,
2176 and n. 340 (2010).
46 1 Nelson, The Common Law, at 71.
47 Examples include the two volumes of Chester J. Antieau, The Practice of Extraordinary
Remedies: Habeas Corpus and the Other Common Law Writs (New York: Oceana
Publications, 1987); Horace G. Wood, A Treatise on the Legal Remedies of Mandamus and
Prohibition, Habeas Corpus, Certiorari and Quo Warranto (2d ed., 1891); the two volumes
of James L. High, A Treatise on Extraordinary Legal Remedies, Embracing Mandamus, Quo
Warranto and Prohibition (2d ed., 1884); and the influential discussion in 3 William
Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1768), ch. 8,
at 129–38. For a terse overview of the various prerogative writs as instruments of appellate
review, see John H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History (London: Butterworths
Tolley, 4th ed., 2006), 143–50; see also 2 Nelson, The Common Law, at 54.
Among the modern contexts in which this material is relevant is in the construction of the
All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, a direct descendant of a provision of the Judiciary Act of
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1789. See United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 221–22 (1952).
48 Thus, for example, in New Hampshire around 1699 “appeals” replaced review by habeas
corpus or certiorari. See Elwin L. Page, Judicial Beginnings in New Hampshire 1640–1700
(Concord: New Hampshire Historical Society, 1959), 42. But that had changed by 1769. See
Dimension 1, at 605 n.74 (citing cases where appeals unavailable and certiorari succeeded).
Indeed, Peter Pearse’s successful certiorari petition described in chapter 2 (B) (i) noted that
he had sought leave to appeal from the inferior court but had been denied.
49 See Ex Parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 202 (1830) (Marshall, C.J.) (“The writ of habeas
corpus is a high prerogative writ, known to the common law, the great object of which is the
liberation of those who may be imprisoned without sufficient cause. It is in the nature of a
writ of error, to examine the legality of the commitment”). Like the other common law writs,
habeas corpus was divided into various formal categories. See Ex Parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4
Cranch) 75, 97–100 (1807) (explicating categories). But in actual practice these distinctions
were frequently not observed. From the late seventeenth century onward, King’s Bench in
England combined the existing forms of the writ in creative ways to deal with issues raised
by private restraints in such contexts as slavery, apprenticeship, and domestic relations, with
the goal of reaching outcomes, preferably negotiated ones, that addressed the problems
underlying the detentions. See Halliday, Habeas Corpus, at 101, 116–21. As the cases of the
alleged slave Peter Johnson and the apprentice John Bird described in chapter 2 (A) (iii) and
(B) (iii) (b) illustrate, colonial courts followed the same practice. So did early national ones.
See Dimension 1, at 606 n.76; Dimension 2, at 23 n.80.
Thus, habeas corpus is among those constitutional areas in which there is solid historical
basis for considering an anticipation of future evolution to be part of original intent. See Eric
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M. Freedman, “On Protecting Accountability,” 27 Hofstra Law Review 677, 687, and n.17
(1999); L. Kinvin Wroth, “The Constitution and the Common Law: The Original Intent
About the Original Intent,” 22 Suffolk University Law Review 553, 560–63 (1988); Eric M.
Freedman, Note, {AU: Opening quotation mark OK to add here? = Yes} “The United States
and the Articles of Confederation: Drifting Toward Anarchy or Inching Toward
Commonwealth?,” 88 Yale Law Journal 142, 162–64, 165 (1978). See also Bernadette
Meyler, “Towards a Common Law Originalism,” 59 Stanford Law Review 551 (2006)
(“common law originalism attempts to square fidelity to the Founding era with fidelity to its
common law jurisprudence—a jurisprudence that retained continuity yet emphasized
flexibility”).
50 The three-volume work, Charles M. Gray, The Writ of Prohibition: Jurisdiction in Early
Modern English Law (New York: Oceana Publications, 1994), which focuses on England
from the later sixteenth century to the middle of the seventeenth, describes the sometimesobscure overlap between prohibition and habeas corpus, in volume 1 at vii, xxv–vi and
volume 2 at 315–16, 341–74, 401–30. The mutually supportive roles of prohibition and
habeas corpus in securing liberty in Massachusetts in the middle of the eighteenth century are
discussed in John Philip Reid, In a Defiant Stance: The Conditions of Law in Massachusetts
Bay, the Irish Comparison, and the Coming of the American Revolution (University Park:
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1977), 68–70. For a North Carolina example from 1728
see Nelson, “Politicizing the Courts,” at 2156–59 (after obtaining prohibition from common
law court against admiralty proceedings, litigant secures release from imprisonment in
connection with latter by habeas corpus).
Whether or not they sought habeas corpus, litigants frequently sought prohibition against
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admiralty proceedings in favor of ones at common law so that their liabilities would be
determined by a jury, a development that assumed considerable legal and political
significance in the decades surrounding the Revolution, as described in Dimension 1, at 606
n.77 and Dimension 3, at 271 n.97.
51 See Rector v. Price, 1 Mo. 198, 200–01 (1822) (holding that court would use certiorari, like
habeas corpus, to remedy fundamental failures of justice); Philip Hamburger, Law and
Judicial Duty (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), 384–91 (describing 1778
litigation in North Carolina using certiorari to test status of a large group of alleged slaves);
note 12 to chapter 11 (certiorari used around 1547 to release English prisoner who had been
pardoned). In many cases, certiorari and habeas corpus were employed in tandem. See
Dimension 1, at 607 n. 81; Lee Kovarsky, “A Constitutional Theory of Habeas Power,” 98
Virginia Law Review 753, 800–802 (2013).
52 This distinction is explicated in Dimension 1, at 607 n.81. In any event, Pearse may have been
perfectly happy to proceed by certiorari because that route put before the decision-maker the
entire file containing the narration of his travails rather than just a jailer’s return that might
well have annexed only the order committing Pearse for contempt.
53 See 9 William Holdsworth, A History of English Law (London: Methuen & Co., 3d ed.,
1944), 106–07.
54 Cf. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109–111 (1945) (cautioning that distinction
between substance and procedure under Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), must be
“applied with an eye alert to essentials” of the particular problem at hand, regardless of
terms’ use in other contexts, because a “policy so important . . . must be kept free from
entanglements with analytical or terminological niceties”). Thus, to take an example
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described in Freedman, Habeas Corpus at 34, 169 n.30, in 1824 a federal judge in Georgia
concluded that an alleged debtor was being wrongfully confined and should be released. See
Bullock v. United States (C.C. D. Ga., April 28, 1824). The judge thereupon sent the jailer
not a writ of habeas corpus but rather an injunction against further incarceration of the
prisoner. It is hard to see what difference the distinction might make for any purpose of
present relevance.
55 Halliday, Habeas Corpus, at 92.
56 Ibid., at 77–83 (observing that the various prerogative writs were united by a sweeping
conception that it was the role of the judges to ensure that the King’s justice was being done
to the prisoner). Because of this central focus on justice rather than law in any situation
where the two might be in conflict, as well as its flexible and pragmatic orientation with
regard to remedies described later in this chapter, the writ of habeas corpus has been
recognized since the seventeenth century as governed by equitable principles. See ibid., at
87–93,102; Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 646 (2010); Erica Hashimoto, “Reclaiming the
Equitable Heritage of Habeas,” 108 Northwestern University Law Review 139, 143–45
(2013); Brief of Eleven Legal Historians as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Holland,
2009 WL 5945956. (I was one of the amici who submitted this brief.)
57 See Freedman, Habeas Corpus, at 37.
58 There is an extensive collection of sources in Dimension 1, at 609 n.89. Moreover, the mere
fact that a report appeared in print did not make it reliable. Varying reporters and publishers
had differing standards of accuracy and differing editorial policies. See Tim Hitchcock and
William J. Turkel, “The Old Bailey Proceedings, 1674–1913: Text Mining for Evidence of
Court Behavior,” 34 Law and History Review 929, 933–34 (2016) (listing reasons why
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reports bear an “inconsistent and ambiguous relationship” to what actually happened in
court).
59 See text accompanying note 17 to chapter 12 (explaining context); Dimension 3, at 271–72
and nn.96–100 (providing documentation).
60 See Mary Sarah Bilder, “The Origin of the Appeal in America,” 48 Hastings Law Journal
913, 925, 927 (1997) (explaining non-hierarchical structure of English common law courts in
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries); David Rossman, “‘Were There No Appeal’: The
History of Review in American Criminal Courts,” 81 Journal of Criminal Law &
Criminology 518, 529–30 (1990) (describing how same judges heard trials and appeals).
This is the background against which, as the Supreme Court has often reiterated, at
common law res judicata did not apply to a denial of habeas corpus relief. Rather, “a renewed
application could be made to every other judge or court in the realm, and each court or judge
was bound to consider the question of the prisoner’s right to a discharge independently, and
not to be influenced by the previous decisions refusing discharge.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S.
298, 317 (1995) (citing McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 479 (1991), and repeating its
quotation from William Smithers Church, A Treatise on the Writ of Habeas Corpus § 386, at
570 (2d ed. 1893)). I was an author of an amicus brief in Schlup.
61 See Dimension 1, at 610 and nn.91–92.
62 Cf. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., “Codes and the Arrangement of the Law,” 5 American Law
Review 1, 1 (1870) (“It is the merit of the common law that it decides the case first and
determines the principle afterwards. . . . It is only after a series of determinations on the same
subject-matter that it becomes necessary to ‘reconcile the cases,’ as it is called, that is, by a
true induction to state the principle which has until then been obscurely felt.”)
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63 See William R. Casto, The Supreme Court in the Early Republic: The Chief Justiceships of
John Jay and Oliver Ellsworth (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1995), 34–35,
156 (“Virtually all lawyers agreed that judges did not make the common law; they merely
administered the common law that already existed in nature”); G. Edward White,
“Recovering the World of the Marshall Court,” 33 John Marshall Law Review 781, 791–93
(2000).
64 See William D. Popkin, Evolution of the Judicial Opinion: Institutional and Individual Styles
(New York: New York University Press, 2007), 10 (describing English system prior to 1750
as one “where a close-knit and expert bench and bar collaborated to reach a decision”).
65 See 2 James Oldham, The Mansfield Manuscripts and the Growth of English Law in the
Eighteenth Century (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992), 1230 (quoting
Lord Mansfield to this effect).
66 For example, when in the spring of 1744 the judges of the New Hampshire Superior Court
were divided on appeal in a legally tangled case arising out of a bitter religious dispute, they
adjourned so that counsel could “State the case and apply for advisement to the neighbouring
lawyers on the Case.” When that consultation failed to occur, the judges considered, but
apparently could not decide, whether to allow a further adjournment on the basis that there
was a Superior Court session to be held at York “in June next when they might have
opportunity of conversing with some of the Principal Lawyers of the neighborhood who
would attend the session.” The documentation appears in the New Hampshire State Archives:
Judgment Book of Superior Court, Vol. A, Aug. 1744–[June 1750], at 69–71; Provincial
Case File No. 025518; and in Superior Court Minutes, 1699–1750, Superior Court Docket
Box 1, Folder 1744–45 (Entry no. 24 for Feb. 5, 1744). A description of the case, Leavett v.
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Sinkler, appears in 3 Nelson, The Common Law, at 113–14.
67 In fact, until well into the nineteenth century, when the pressures described in chapter 12 (B)
began to be felt, substantive statutes were of relatively minor importance to judicial decisionmaking. See Ellen Holmes Pearson, “American Legal Scholars and the Republicanization of
the Common Law,” in Empire and Nation: The American Revolution in the Atlantic World
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, Eliga H. Gould & Peter S. Onuf eds., 2005), 93,
97; Carolyn Steedman, “At Every Bloody Level: A Magistrate, a Framework-Knitter, and the
Law,” 30 Law and History Review 387, 408 (2012). For supportive evidence from New
Hampshire see chapter 6, at note 27 and text accompanying notes 41–43.
68 See Halliday, Habeas Corpus, at 55–58, 239–43, 215–56; Paul D. Halliday and G. Edward
White, “The Suspension Clause: English Text, Imperial Contexts, and American
Implications,” 94 Virginia Law Review 575, 631–32 (2008); A. H. Carpenter, “Habeas
Corpus in the Colonies,” 8 American Historical Review 18, 26–27 (1902); Dimension 2, at 4
n.5. See also 1 Randy Hertz and James S. Liebman, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and
Procedure (New Providence, NJ: LexisNexis, 7th ed., 2015) § 2.2 at 14–17 (describing views
of Supreme Court on relationship between judge-made and statutory law of habeas corpus).
69 See Freedman, Habeas Corpus, at 37. There is a further discussion of the sources of the
common law in the text accompanying notes 11–12 to chapter 14, and in Dimension 3, at 294
n.211.
70 For a powerful argument that modern legal actors forgot this lesson in the context of the
Guantanamo Bay habeas litigations, see Sabin Willett, “Clericalism and the Guantanamo
Litigation,” 1 Northeastern University Law Journal 51, 52, 56–58 (2009).
71 Cf. Note, “Review of Orders in Habeas Corpus Proceedings,” 25 Harvard Law Review 460
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(1912) (observing critically that, notwithstanding frequent presence of important legal issues,
most states deny “review by appellate courts of adjudications in habeas corpus proceedings”
and commenting that the only substantial justification for this “rests upon the doctrine
underlying the writ of habeas corpus, namely the need of a speedy adjudication”).
72 As indicated in note 6, habeas courts valued negotiated outcomes of this sort. See Halliday,
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